TITLE VI OF THE 1964 CIVIL RIGHTS ACT AND
THE CLOSING OF A PUBLIC HOSPITAL
Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 19641 prohibits racial discrimination in programs or activities that receive federal funding. Courts
have construed the statute to empower both private parties 2 and the

federal government 3 to take their grievances to court and challenge
program officials to alter their policies or risk losing federal assistance.

These courts, however, have not agreed upon the elements necessary
4
for the plaintiffs prima facie showing of a violation of Title VI.
This note first establishes that the Supreme Court is moving to-

ward the application of the intent standard used in adjudicating constitutional equal protection claims under Title VI. The note explores the

problems that Title VI plaintiffs experience in proving discriminatory
intent according to the Court's articulation of this burden of proof in

recent equal protection cases.5 Focusing on a series of unsuccessful
challenges of urban-public-hospital closings, the note illustrates the in-

jurious and racially disproportionate impact of government action
when discriminatory intent is required to prove Title VI violations.
The injection of the intent standard into Title VI is unfortunate,
because federal support will continue for local programs that have adverse consequences for a racial minority group. Application of the in1. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d to d-4 (1976). Title VI, in part, states that "[n]o person in the United
States shall, on the ground of race, color, or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be
denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving
Federal financial assistance." Id. § 2000d.
2. See 1 C. AwrIEAu, FEDERAL CIVIL RIGHTS AcTs: CIVIL PRAcrICE § 313, at 525-27 (2d
ed. 1980). See also Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563, 571 n.2 (1974) (Stewart, J., concurring).
3. See 1 C. ANTIEAU, supra note 2, § 312, at 525.
4. See, e.g., NAACP v. Medical Center, Inc., 657 F.2d 1322, 1333-35 (3d Cir. 1981); Bryan v.
Koch, 492 F. Supp. 212, 229 (S.D.N.Y.), af'd, 627 F.2d 612 (2d Cir. 1980). A series of recent law
journal articles have reviewed the controversy. See Abernathy, Title VI and the Constitution: A
Regulatory Model/for Defning "Discrimination," 70 GEO. L.J. 1, 16-20 (1981); Note, The Prima
Facie Case andRemedies in Title VI HospitalRelocation Cases, 65 CORNELL L. REV. 689, 700-07
(1980); Note, MunicipalHospitalClosings Under Title V1" A Requirement of Reasonable Jstfjcations, 9 FORDHAM UtB. L. J. 943, 956-66 (1981); Note, MaintainingHealth Carein the Inner City.Title VI and HospitalRelocations,55 N.Y.U.L. REV. 271, 278-90 (1980); Note, Title VP" The Impact/Intent DebateEnters the MunicipalServices.Arena, 55 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 124, 130-35 (1980);
Note, NAACP v. Medical Center, Inc.: The Evidentiary Hearing Under Title VI, 24 ST. LOUIS
U.LJ. 579 (1980). See also Chavkin, HealthAccess andthe Civil Rights Laws: The Smoking Gun
and Other Sorrows, 15 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 561 (1981).
5. See, e.g., Personnel Adm'r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256 (1979); Village of Arlington Heights v.
Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
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tent test will deprive minority communities of one important legal
means to force local officials to implement alternative programs with
less injurious consequences. As the hospital closing cases show, the intent standard does not protect citizens from discriminatory effects, even
when those effects are as serious as the lack of medical services resulting from the closing of a municipal hospital.
I.

TITLE VI AND THE REQUIREMENT OF DISCRIMINATORY INTENT

Federal courts have not yet produced a definitive standard to identify racial discrimination forbidden by Title VI. Awaiting a conclusive
interpretation of Title VI by the Supreme Court, lower federal courts
have applied two separate tests, both derived from equal protection jurisprudence. The first test requires the plaintiff to present evidence of a
disproportionate and injurious impact of the defendant's action on the
members of a racial minority group.6 The second test requires the
plaintiff to present evidence of the defendant's discriminatory intent in
addition to showing the disproportionate impact of the defendant's action.7 The test chosen by a court significantly affects the outcome of the
case because a plaintiff may be able to prove only impact and not
intent.8
6. The impact test requires the plaintiff to prove that the defendant's facially neutral decision or action has injured disproportionately the members of the protected group relative to the
injury to nonmembers. Plaintiffs are not required to demonstrate discriminatory intent. For example, in Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960), the Court struck down an Alabama statute
that realigned the boundaries of the City of Tuskegee and had the "essential inevitable effect of
[depriving]... the Negro petitioners discriminatorily of the benefits of residence in Tuskegee,
including.., the right to vote in municipal elections." Id. at 341. Because of its discriminatory
effect, the statute was held to be in violation of the fifteenth amendment rights of the black voters.
See, e.g., Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 432 (1971) (impact test used to identify discriminatory employment practices under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964). See generally
Perry, The Disproportionate Impact Theory of RacialDiscrimination,125 U. PA. L. REV. 540, 54448 (1977).
7. The intent test requires the plaintiff to present evidence--direct or circumstantial-establishing that the defendant acted with a specific discriminatory purpose. The intent test has been
used to determine whether a facially neutral decision or action that has a disproportionate impact
on the members of a protected class violates the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. Evidence of impact, by itself, is insufficient to establish an illegitimate purpose. See Village
of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976). See generally Note, DiscriminatoryPurposeandDIsproportionateImpact:
4n Assessment After Feeney, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 1376, 1378-85 (1979).
8. The choice between these threshold tests has become increasingly important as the nature
of Title VI cases (and equal protection cases) has changed. Most practices challenged today are
racially neutral on their face. See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 349 n.17
(1978) (Brennan, White, Marshall, and Blackmun, JJ., concurring in part, dissenting in part); Belton, Burdens of Pleadingand Proofin DiscriminationCases: Toward a Theory of ProceduralJuslice, 34 VAND. L. REv. 1205, 1224, 1281-82 (1981) ("i1t is increasingly rare to encounter the kinds
of direct and overt practices that originally prompted Congress to enact the discrimination laws.
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In Regents of the University of Caiffornia v. Bakke, 9 the Supreme
Court took the first step toward determining the burden of proof under

Title VI. In Bakke the plaintiff challenged a special admissions policy
for minority students at the medical school of the University of Califor-

nia at Davis. The plaintiff alleged that his exclusion from the federally
assisted medical school violated Title VI because express racial quotas

were included in the admissions policy.' 0 Five Justices, in dicta in two
separate opinions, observed that the test for Title VI discrimination
should not be broader than the test used for an equal protection violation under the fifth and fourteenth amendments.I
The Justices based their conclusion on a review of the congres-

sional debates concerning the enactment of the Act.12 In those debates,
proponents of the Act argued that Title VI was necessary to terminate

federal support of state and local programs that were racially segregated on a separate-but-equal basis.13 The Justices concluded that
Congress viewed Title VI as part of an effort to implement the mandate
of Brown v. Boardof Education,14 in which the Court held that a separate-but-equal arrangement for public schools violated the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment.' 5 Furthermore, Congress
intended Title VI to remove all federal support from state and local

programs that violated the Brown Court's interpretation of equal proMany claims of discrimination today deal with systemic, subtle, and sterotypical [sic] practiceswhich developed when overt discrimination was lawful--and are imbedded in basic institutional
and organizational structures.' Id at 1224.); Schwemm, From Washington to Arlington Heights
and Beyond" DiscriminatoryPurpose in Equal ProtectionLitigation, 1977 U. ILL. L.F. 961, 974.
9. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
10. Id. at 272-81 (Powell, J., announcing the judgment of the Court). See generally Bakke v.
Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 18 Cal. 2d 34, 553 P.2d 1152, 132 Cal. Rptr. 680 (1976), aff'dinpart
andrev'd in part, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
11. 438 U.S. at 287 (dicta) (Powell, J.); id. at 328-40 (dicta) (Brennan, White, Marshall, and
Blackmun, J.J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). Justice Stevens's opinion does not address
the question of the appropriate test for Title VI. See also NAACP v. Medical Center, Inc., 657
F.2d 1322 (3d Cir. 1981). In Medical Center the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit narrowly
interpreted the portions of the Bakke opinions that address Title VI and held that Title VI requires only a showing of discriminatory effect to establish a prima facie case. The Medical Center
court distinguished Bakke, maintaining that the constitutional intent standard applies only to
those Title VI plaintiffs who allege intentional discrimination in an affirmative action plan. Id. at
1329-30.
12. 438 U.S. at 284-87 (Powell, J.); id. at 328-40 (Brennan, White, Marshall, and Blackmun,
J3., concurring in part, dissenting in'part). But see Abernathy, supra note 4, at 20-32, 38-39 (arguing for an interpretation of the legislative intent of Title VI different from that reached by the
Justices in Bakke).
13. See, eg., 110 CONG. REc. 1527-28 (1964) (remarks of Rep. Celler); id. at 1619-20 (remarks of Rep. Abernathy); Id. at 5608-12 (remarks of Sen. Ervin); id. at 6046-53 (remarks of Sen.
Johnston); id. at 6544-47 (remarks of Sen. Humphrey); id. at 6561-62 (remarks of Sen. Kuchel).
14. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
15. Id. at 495.
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tection. 16 Because the proponents of Title VI in Congress expected the
Court's interpretation of constitutionally forbidden discrimination to
control the enforcement of Title VI, they did not provide a standard or
definition of discrimination to govern that Title. 17 The five Justices in
Bakke concurred that the Court should follow Congress's apparent in8
tent to link Title VI to the Court's interpretation of equal protection.'

Even though two of the separate opinions in Bakke conclude that
Congress intended the constitutional equal protection standard to govern the enforcement of Title VI, neither opinion connects this conclusion to the Court's earlier decision in Washington v. Davis. t9 In
Washington the Court held that a plaintiff must establish at least a
prima facie case of the defendant's discriminatory intent to prove a
constitutional violation of equal protection. 20 In Bakke the Justices reviewed the legislative history to determine whether Title VI invalidates
a state-sponsored affirmative-action plan and thus never expressly indicated what proof Title VI requires in a case of alleged injurious dis21
crimination against minorities.
In its 1979 decision in Board of Education v. Harris,22 the Court

again commented on, but did not decide, the appropriate test for Title
16. 438 U.S. at 286-87 (dicta) (Powell, J.); id. at 328-40 (dicta) (Brennan, White, Marshall,
and Blackmun, J.J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). See 110 CONG. REc. 6543-47 (1964)
(remarks of Sen. Humphrey); Id. at 7062-64 (remarks of Sen. Pastore); id. at 13,333 (remarks of
Sen. Ribicofi).
17. The opponents of Title VI strongly criticized the failure of the statute to independently
define "discrimination." Senator Ervin complained that the silence of Title V left the determination of a definition "to the executive department or agencies administering each program, without
any guideline whatever to point out what is the congressional intent." 110 CONG. REC. 5612 (1964)
(remarks of Sen. Ervin). The prcponents of Title VI replied that the statute would follow the
constitutional definition of discrimination. Representative Celler added, "Congress clearly has
the power to legislate so as to insure that the Federal Government does not become involved in a
violation of the Constitution." .d. at 1528 (remarks of Rep. Celler). See id. at 6561 (remarks of
Sen. Kuchel); id. at 7057 (remarks of Sen. Pastore). Proponents apparently anticipated that the
constitutional definition of discrimination would be further refined by the federal courts and that
Title VI would follow this development. A separate definition of discrimination for Title VI was
thought to create the risk that Title VI would allow federal support for programs which are valid
under the statutory definition bt which contain segregated arrangements otherwise held to be
unconstitutional. See id. at 12,677 (remarks of Sen. Allot).
18. 438 U.S. at 286-87 (dicta) (Powell, J.); id. at 328 (dicta) (Brennan, White, Marshall, and
Blackmun, 3.J.,
concurring in part, dissenting in part).
19. 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
20. Id. at 242.
21. But see Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 352 (dicta) (Brennan, White,
concurring in part, dissenting in part) (by questioning the earlier
Marshall, and Blackmun, JJ.,
Title VI decision of Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563 (1974), Justice Brennan comes closest to adopting an intent requirement for Title VI). For a discussion of Lau, see text accompanying notes 4048 infra.
22. 444 U.S. 130 (1979).
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VI.23 The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit had determined,
based on its reading of congressional intent, that an impact test was
appropriate for defining discrimination under both the Emergency
School Aid Act (ESAA) 24 and Title VI. 25 The Supreme Court agreed
that Congress had clearly intended that an impact test govern the application of the ESAA 26 and affirmed the appellate court's decision solely
on that basis.27 In so doing the Court avoided deciding the Title VI
claim.28 In dicta, the majority distinguished Title VI from the ESAA 29

and expressed a willingness to impose a narrower standard to identify
Title VI discrimination.30 The majority commented that, in contrast to

relief under the ESAA, Title VI relief-the termination of all federal
funding-is so drastic that Congress reasonably could have desired the
3
Title VI remedy to apply only in cases of intentional discrimination. '

The dissenting Justices in Harrisalso commented on Title VI and en-

dorsed the reasoning found in Bakke that links Title VI to the constitutional test for discrimination. 32 Considering Bakke and Harris, six

Justices of the present Court have agreed to apply an intent standard to
Title VIP3
The legislative history of Title VI provides additional support, not
cited in Bakke or Harris,for requiring a showing of intent. During the
1964 congressional debates over Title VI, the statute's proponents re3 4 a decision
lied on Simkins v. Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital,
handed down by the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit. The

Simkins court held that certain provisions of the Hill-Burton Act,3 5
which authorized federal support for hospitals that were racially segregated on a separate-but-equal basis, violated the equal protection
23. Id. at 149 (dicta).
24. 20 U.S.C. § 3191 (Supp. III 1979).
25. Board of Educ. v. Califano, 584 F.2d 576, 588-89 (2d Cir. 1978), af'dsub nom. Board of
Educ. v. Harris, 444 U.S. 130 (1979).
26. 444 U.S. at 146-47.
27. Id. at 149, 151-52.
28. Id. at 149 (dicta) ("There thus is no need here for the Court to be concerned with the
issue whether Title VI ... incorporates the constitutional standard. . . . Consideration of that
issue would be necessary only if there were a positive indication either in Title VI or in ESAA that
the two Acts were intended to be coextensive").
29. "A violation of Title VI may result in a cutoff of all federal funds. . . . In contrast, only
ESAA funds are rendered unavailable when an ESAA violation is found." Id. at 150.
30. Id. (dicta).
31. Id. (dicta).
32. Id. at 160 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
33. Justices Brennan, White, Marshall, Blackmun, and Powell stated their views in h'akke.
See text accompanying note 11 supra. Justice Rehnquist joined Justice Stewart's dissent in Harris.
34. 323 F.2d 959 (4th Cir. 1963) (en bane), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 938 (1964).
35. Ch. 958, § 622(0, 60 Stat. 1041 (1946) (repealed 1964).
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clause.36 The supporters of Title VI used Simkins to illustrate judicial
support for their contention that federal funding of any program that
37
provides separate or unequal services to blacks is unconstitutional.
Segregation in public programs was often expressly authorized by state
law and, if not, separate-but-equal arrangements could have been explained only by the conscious discriminatory intent of official decisionmakers. The reliance on Simkins and on the examples of segregated

programs provided by proponents of the Act 38 strongly suggests that
Congress intended Title VI to end federal support for separate-butequal racial segregation and other forms of unequal treatment intentionally imposed by state and local governments. Congress seems to
have considered discriminatory effects which occur in the absence of
39
official intent to be beyond the reach of the statute.
36. 323 F.2d at 970.
37. See 110 CONG. REC. 6561 (1964) (remarks of Sen. Kuchel); id. at 6544 (remarks of Sen.
Humphrey). Federal legislation that allowed federal funds to be granted to separate-but-equal
facilities included the Second Morrill Act of 1890, ch. 841, 26 Stat. 417 (current version at 7 U.S.C.
§ 323 (1976)) (land-grant colleges) and the School Facilities Construction Act, ch. 995, §§ 201-202,
64 Stat. 969 (1950) (current version at 20 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l)(F) (1976)) (provision that compliance
with state law was adequate to ensure no discrimination implicitly allowed for separate-but-equal
school construction that was valid under state law). See 110 CONG. REC. 10,075-77 (1964) (letter
from Att'y Gen. Kennedy to Sen. Cooper). See also UNITED STATES COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS,
THE FEDERAL CIVIL RIGHTS ENFORCEMENT EFFORT-1974 3-4 (1975); Comment, Title VIoflhe
Civil RightsAct ofl-964-Implementation andImpact, 36 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 824, 828-29 (1968).
38. Examples of programs which would come under Title VI included public schools, higher
education, agricultural extension services, vocational training, and school lunches. See 109 CONG.
REc. 23,531 (1963) (remarks of Sen. Javits); 110 CONG. REc. 6543-45 (1964) (remarks of Sen.
Humphrey); id. at 7054-58 (remarks of Sen. Pastore); id. at 7100-03 (remarks of Sen. Javits).
39. Judge Wisdom, in the early Title VI case of United States v. Jefferson County Bd. of
Educ., 372 F.2d 836 (5th Cir. 1966), aff'den bane, 380 F.2d 385 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S.
840 (1967), observed that when Congress enacted Title VI, it was aware of an unsuccessful civil
rights challenge to a de facto-segregated school system in Gary, Indiana and thus it did not intend
Title VI to extend to federal funding involving programs characterized by de facto segregation.
Id. at 881-82. The decision in the Gary, Indiana action referred to by Judge Wisdom, Bell v.
School City, 213 F. Supp. 819 (N.D. Ind.), aj'd, 324 F.2d 209 (7th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 377
U.S. 924 (1964), centered on the failure of the plaintiffs to show deliberate segregation; Brown v.
Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), did not apply because the plaintiff did not prove the
existence of any state action. Additionally, some congressional supporters of Title VI suggested
that in communities where segregation was not compelled by law, desegregation planning would
be left to the state and local governments, not forced by an application of Title VI. See 110 CONG.
REC. 10,920 (1964) (remarks of Sen. Javits); id. at 5807, 5266 (remarks of Sen. Keating); Id. at
13,821 (remarks of Sens. Humphrey and Saltonstall). But see Civil Rghts-The Presidentr Program, 1963: Hearingson S. 1731 andS. 1750 Before the Sen. Comm. on Judiciary, 88th Cong., 1st
Sess. 255 (1963) (remarks by Att'y Gen. Kennedy suggesting that Title VI is directed at de facto
school segregation in the North).
Senator Humphrey defined discrimination under Title II and Title VII of H.R. 7152, as
amended (enacted as Title II and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, §§ 201-207, 78 Stat. 243
(1964), and §§ 701-716, 78 Stat. 253 (1964), respectively), as requiring "a showing that those engaged in the pattern or practice [of discrimination] had the intention to deprive others of their
rights .... ." 110 CONG. REc. 14,270 (1964) (remarks of Sen. Humphrey). Senator Humphrey
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Despite the dicta in Bakke and Harrisand the legislative history

of Title VI, the question of the appropriate test for Title VI discrimination remains unresolved. The intent requirement test appears to be in

direct conflict with the Court's 1974 decision in Lau v. Nichols. 40 In
Lau the Court followed the language of Title VI's implementing regu-

lations and required only a showing of discriminatory effects to establish a violation of Title VI. 4 1 The Courts of Appeals for the Third and
the Ninth Circuits have continued to follow the Lau interpretation of

Title VI; the Courts of Appeals for the Second, Fifth and Tenth Cir42
cuits, however, have expressed support for the intent standard.

In Lau the Court held that the San Francisco school system's failure to teach English to Chinese-American students who did not speak
English was a violation of Title VI. 43 The students did not allege that
this failure was intentional, but claimed only that the effect of the
schools' action was to deny the students equal access to educational

benefits. 44 Without the ability to communicate in English, the students
were "effectively foreclosed from any meaningful education." 4 5 The

Court based its interpretation of Title VI on the language of the enforcement regulations issued by the Department of Health, Education,
provided this definition to defend Titles II and VII against the objection that they allowed the
Attorney General "unlimited power to bring suit," id., a charge that was also made against Title
VI. While Senator Humphrey was answering only for Titles II and VII of the Act, it is not unreasonable to conclude that his formulation also applied to Title VL
40. 414 U.S. 563 (1974).
41. Id. at 567-69. The Lau decision precedes Washington v. Davis, 426 US. 229 (1976), and
it does not focus on the Court's later emphatic distinction between the intent and impact
standards.
42. The cases supporting the continued use of the Lau standard include: NAACP v. Medical
Center, Inc., 657 F.2d 1322, 1328-30 (3d Cir. 1981); Guadaloupe Org., Inc. v. Tempe Elementary
School Dist. No. 3, 587 F.2d 1022, 1029 & n.6 (9th Cir. 1978); De La Cruz v. Tormey, 582 F.2d 45,
61 & n.16 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 965 (1979); Larry P. v. Riles, 495 F. Supp. 926,
964-65 (N.D. Cal. 1979). Cases supporting the application of the intent test include: Castaneda v.
Pickard, 648 F.2d 989, 1000 (5th Cir. 1981); Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Service Comm'n, 633 F.2d
232,257 (2d Cir. 1980), cert.granted,50 U.S.L.W. 3547 (U.S. Jan. 11, 1982) (No. 81-431); Bryan v.
Koch, 627 F.2d 612, 616 (2d Cir. 1980); Otero v. Mesa County Valley School Dist., 628 F.2d 1271,
1272 (10th Cir. 1980); Parent Ass'n of Andrew Jackson High School v. Ambach, 598 F.2d 705,716
(2d Cir. 1979); United States v. Bexar County, 484 F. Supp. 855, 859 (W.D. Tex. 1980); Valadez v.
Graham, 474 F. Supp. 149, 159 (M.D. Fla. 1979). See Note, Title V1 The Impact/Intent Debate
Entersthe MunicipalServices Arena, 55 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 124, 131-32 (1980). See also Cannon
v. University of Chicago, 648 F.2d 1104, 1109 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 50 U.S.L.W. 3487 (U.S. Dec.
14, 1981) (No. 81-769) (dicta concluding that Title VI requires a showing of intentional
discrimination).
43. 414 U.S. at 568-69.
44. 414 U.S. at 564-69.
45. Id. at 566.
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and Welfare (HEW). 46 The regulations state that recipients of federal

funds "may not, directly or through contractual or other arrangements,
utilize criteria or methods of administration which have the effect of
subjecting individuals to discrimination because of their race, color, or
national origin. . ...47 The Court based its holding that the school
system's language education policy violated Title VI solely on the stu-

dents' demonstration of discriminatory impact. 48

The Court will have to overrule or distinguish Lau if an intent test

is to be imposed for Title VI.49 When given the opportunity the Court
will probably require a showing of discriminatory intent under Title
VI, following its own reading of the legislative history of Title VI and
not the language of the subsequent enforcement regulations cited in
Lau.5 0 If Title VI incorporates the constitutional definition of discrimi-

nation, then the Court's application of the intent test in recent equal
protection cases will guide the courts in evaluating the merit of Title VI
claims.
46. Id. at 566-67. HEW was authorized to issue the regulations necessary to implement Title
VI. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-1 (1976). The Departments of Education and Health and Human
Services are now responsible for these regulations. See 20 U.S.C. § 3474 (Supp. III 1979). The
1980 regulations remain identical to those considered in Lau. See note 47 infra.
47. 45 C.F.R. § 80.3(b)(2) (1980). See also 45 C.F.R. § 80.3(b)(1) (1980) (general statement
of the regulatory enforcement policy of Title VI).
48. 414 U.S. at 568.
49. Justice Brennan's opinion in Bakke expresses serious doubt about the correctness of the
Court's previous use of the disproportionate-impact standard in Lau to identify discrimination
under Title VI. 438 U.S. at 352. The Bakke opinion cited Lau to demonstrate that programs that
receive federal funds still have significant discretion to adopt race-conscious policies whose specific purpose is to remedy the effects of past discrimination. Id at 350-53 (dicta) (Brennan, White,
Marshall, and Blackmun, JJ.,
concurring in part, dissenting in part).
In Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980), the Court again cited Lau in a decision addressing affirmative action remedies. In Fullilove the Court upheld the constitutionality of a 10%
allotment of federal construction funds for minority contractors. Id at 491-92 (Burger, C.J., announcing the opinion of the Court). The Court cited Lau as a precedent supporting Congress's
power to disburse federal funds contingent on the grantee's acceptance of federal regulation. .d.
at 479-80. The Lau decision is discussed further because of the similarity between the "affirmative
steps" required of the San Francisco school system in Lau and the 10% allotment required of
government contractors receiving funds under the minority business regulations. Id. at 479-80.
The Fulllove Court emphasized the remedial aspect of the Lau decision, but did not address the
use of the disproportionate impact test for Title VI.
50. Several Justices have already questioned the validity of the Lau interpretation of Title
VI. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 352 (1978) (dicta) (Brennan, White,
Marshall, and Blackmun, J.J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). The interpretation of Title
VI is presently before the Court in Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 633 F.2d 232 (2d Cir.
1980), cert. granted,50 U.S.L.W. 3547 (U.S. Jan. 11, 1982) (No. 81-431). Butsee Abernathy, supra
note 4. Professor Abernathy argues that Congress intended Title VI to be enforced according to
the regulatory interpretation of administrative agencies.

TITLE V1
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APPLYING THE INTENT TEST

Recent equal protection cases clearly establish that evidence of racially disproportionate impact is insufficient to challenge statutes or
government actions that are racially neutral on their face and that the
plaintiff has the burden of presenting a prima facie case of discriminatory intent. 5' Establishing a prima facie case of discriminatory intent is
crucial for the equal protection plaintiff; such proof triggers the application of a strict standard of review. Once a prima facie case is established, the burden is shifted to the defendant,5 2 who has the
opportunity either to show a compelling state interest to justify the ac54
tion5 3 or to rebut the factual allegation of discriminatory intent.
A.

The Development of the EqualProtection Intent Test.

The Court's 1976 decision in Washington v. Davis5 5 marked the
beginning of the development of the Court's express use of "intent"
and "effects" to identify forbidden racial discrimination. Although the
Washington Court did not completely dismiss evidence of the impact of
government action, it held that evidence of discriminatory intent is necessary to establish a prima facie case of discrimination. 5 6 The Court
recognized that intent is not always expressed or plainly apparent and
that circumstantial evidence--"the totalilty of relevant facts"-includ57
ing evidence of disproportionate impact may be used to infer intent.
Nevertheless, the Washington Court emphasized that evidence of dis58
proportionate impact alone does not suffice to prove intent.
In the term following Washington, the Court began the process of
deciding the acceptable sources of the proof of discriminatory intent.
In Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development
51. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 242 (1976). Statutes using explicit racial categories
are more easily challenged; the use of race is presumed invalid and the burden shifts to the defendant to show a compelling state justification. See Perry, The DisproportionateImpact Theory of
RacialDiscrimination, 125 U. PA. L. REv. 540, 550-51 (1977). Laws with racially neutral provisions pose more significant problems today because they are more prevalent than racially explicit
laws. Belton, supra note 8, at 1224; Schwemm, supra note 8, at 1002. See generally Note, Proving
Discriminatory Intent From a FaciallyNeutralDecision With a Disproportionate Impact, 36 WASH.
& LEE L. REv. 109 (1979).
52. Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U.S. 625, 631-32 (1972).
53. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 242 (1976); McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184,
196 (1964).
54. Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 270 n.21
(1977); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 241 (1976). See also Belton, supra note 8, at 1249-50.
55. 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
56. Id. at 242.
57. Id. at 241-42.
58. Id. at 242.
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Corv.,59 Justice Powell listed four potential sources of evidence from
which intent may be inferred: the historical background of the deci-

sion, the specific sequence of events leading up to the challenged decision, departures from the normal procedural 60sequences, and the
legislative or administrative history of the action.
Since the Arlington Heights decision, however, the range of acceptable sources of evidence of intent has been significantly constricted.
Based on dicta in Washington,61 several lower federal courts had applied a reasonable foreseeability test-holding that discriminatory intent may be inferred when the racially disproportionate and adverse
impact of the defendant's action is reasonably foreseeable.6 2 The Court
specifically disapproved of this standard in PersonnelAdministrator v.
Feeney,63 explaining that although the inevitability or the foreseeability
of disproportionate impact may add to the aggregate of evidence from
which intent may be inferred, that evidence standing alone is insufficient to prove intent.64

In dicta, the Arlington Heights Court also described a potential affirmative defense to rebut a plaintiff's prima facie showing of discriminatory intent. A government defendant can demonstrate that its
decision or action would have been the same without the presence of an
illicit motive.65 The Court's provision for this defense is based on its
recognition of the complex nature of official decisionmaking and the
59. 429 U.S. 252 (1977).
60. Id. at 267-68.

61. "Frequently the most probative evidence of intent will be objective evidence of what
actually happened rather than evidence describing the subjective state of mind of the actor. For
normally the actor is presumed to have intended the natural consequences of his deeds." 426 U.S.
at 253 (Stevens, J., concurring).
62. See, eg., Arthur v. Nyquist, 573 F.2d 134, 142 (2d Cir.) ("when . . . actions have the
'natural, probable, and foreseeable result of increasing or perpetuating segregation,' a presumption of segregative purpose is created"), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 860 (1978); United States v. School
Dist., 565 F.2d 127, 128 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1064 (1977); NAACP v. Lansing Bd. of
Educ., 559 F.2d 1042, 1046-48 (6th Cir.), cert. denied,434 U.S. 997 (1977). See generally Note, The
Role of CircumstantialEvidence in Proving DiscriminatoryIntent: Developments Since Washington
v. Davis, 19 B.C.L. REv. 795 (1978); Note, DiscriminatoryPurpose andDiscriminatoryImpact: A4n
/issesmentAflerFeeney, 79 COLUM. L. REv. 1376, 1391-96, 1407-13 (1979). Cf. Note, Readingthe
Mind of the School Board"Segregative Intent and the De Facto/DeJureDistinction, 86 YALE L.J.
317 (1976) (distinguishing between objective intent proven by reasonable foreseeability and "institutional intent" proven by foreseeable discriminatory consequences of official policies).
63. 442 U.S. 256 (1979).
64. Id. at 279 & n.25. Accord, Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449,464-65 (1979);
Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman, 443 U.S. 526, 536 n.9 (1979). Butsee Columbus Bd. of Educ. v.
Penick, 443 U.S. at 508-14 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (arguing that the Columbus Boardof Educa.
tion majority held that foreseeability of disproportionate impact creates a presumption of discriminatory intent).
65. 429 U.S. at 270 n.21. See generally Schwemm, supra note 8, at 1019-23; Note, Discrimina.
tory Purpose,supra note 62, at 1380-81; Comment, ProofofRacially DiscriminatoryPurpose Under
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difficulty of reviewing the balance of competing purposes and interests
that influence every government decision. 66 After Arlington Heights,
the plaintiff's burden of proof is not only to provide evidence of the
defendant's racially discriminatory intent, but also to show that any
legitimate reason is only a pretext and that the official decision was
contingent on an invalid purpose. 67
B. Consequences of Appying the Intent Test.
Applying the intent-test holdings of Washington, Arlington
Heights, and Feeney to Title VI litigation will have serious consequences for plaintiffs. Under the impact test, the minority plaintiff
must prove that his injury is a result of government action and that the
injury is disproportionate to the harm suffered by the white community. Under the intent test, to present a prima-facie case, the plaintiff
but also that the governmust prove not only disproportionate impact,
68
ment acted with discriminatory intent.
It is likely that the injured plaintiffs will not have participated in
the decisionmaking process and will not have enjoyed equal access to
the Equal Protection Clause" Washington v. Davis, Arlington Heights, Mt. Healthy, and Wflliamsburgh, 12 HARV. C.R.-C.L. REv. 725, 745-52 (1977).
66. 429 U.S. at 265. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 252-56 (1976) (Stevens, J., concurring). Justice Stevens emphasized that official decisionmaking is frequently the result of a
balance of many different purposes rather than a single determinative consideration.
67. The affirmative defense described by the Court remained as dicta, however, for the Arlington Heights plaintiff failed to establish the necessary showing of racial discrimination. 429
U.S. at 270 n.21. Thus, although the Court used the opportunity to refine the operation of the
intent test, fairly substantial questions remain unanswered. Those unresolved issues include: the
appropriateness of evidentiary sources not listed inArlingtonHeights; the differential weighting of
evidence from varied sources; the standard of proof required from defendants; and the criteria to
define acceptable governmental interests. See, e.g., United States v. Texas Educ. Agency, 564
F.2d 162, 168 (5th Cir. 1977) ("[in neither Washington v. Davis nor Arlington Heights did the
Supreme Court directly confront the issue of what type of official intent--subjective or objectivea plaintiff must show to present a prima facie case. . . ."), cert.denied, 443 U.S. 915 (1979); Note,
supra note 51, at 118. There is no reason to believe that the Court has completed the process of
articulating the elements of either the constitutional challenge of discrimination or more particularly the contours of the intent test.
In Mount Healthy City Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274 (1977), the Court remanded the
case for a determination of whether the board of education could prove that it would have taken
the same action toward the plaintiff even in the absence of the plaintiff's constitutionally protected
conduct. The shifting of the burden followed the plaintiff's showing that some of his conduct was
protected under the first and fourteenth amendments and that the board's reaction to that conduct
was a significant consideration in the board's decision not to rehire him. The Court directed the
lower court to require from the board a "preponderance of the evidence" to establish its defense,
but did not clarify any of the other questions regarding the intent test. Id. at 284-87.
68. See text accompanying notes 55-67 supra.
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all the information on which the government decision was based. 69
Thus, it will be difficult for the plaintiffs to establish a prima facie case
of their opponent's intent. 70 As outsiders, minority-group plaintiffs will
not be aware of all the historical antecedents to the government's decision or of the procedures by which the government evaluated alterna7
tives and arrived at its final decision. '
When plaintiffs establish the inference of intent, the burden shifts
to the defendants to rebut the inference. 72 The defendants may .demonstrate that their own decisions were motivated by permissible goals and
purposes rather than by illegitimate racial considerations. As the Court
recognized in Arlington Heights, defendants argue from their strongest
position: their firsthand knowledge of the substance and weight given
73
to various considerations involved in their official action.
The result is a two-fold inquiry into intent: first, the plaintiff's
prima facie case, and second, the defendant's affirmative defense. This
arrangement is skewed because the plaintiff is required to provide evidence not only of his own injury, but also of the disproportionate impact of the government action, the presence of discriminatory intent,
and the link between the government action and the illicit intent. The
defendant, however, need only provide evidence of his own legitimate
purpose. This arrangement departs from the Washington Court's original balance between deference to governmental decisionmaking and
the right to equal protection from conduct that discriminates on the
69. See, e.g., Castaneda v. Pickard, 648 F.2d 989, 1004 (5th Cir. 1981) (although Mexican-

Americans are on the district school board they may not be in a position to exercise significant
power over the district's employment decisions); Johnson v. City of Arcadia, 450 F. Supp. 1363,
1369-70 (M.D. Fla. 1978) (evidence of white-city officials' continuing unresponsiveness to the
needs of the black residents of Arcadia). See generally R. LINEBERRY, EQUALITY AND URBAN
POLICY (1977).
70. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229,253 (1976) (Stevens, J., concurring) ("It is unreal-

istic ...

to require the victim of alleged discrimination to uncover the actual subjective intent of

the decisionmaker ....

"); Belton, supra note 8, at 1229, 1281-82; Kleven, The Supreme Court,

Race, and the ClassStruggle, 9 HOFSTRA L. REV. 795, 806 (1981). Belton also questions the fairness of the allocation of burdens under the intent test. The fairness consideration suggests, in part,
the fact that "evidence of a particular element may lie more within the knowledge or control of
one party than another" and that the party in control of the knowledge should be asked to provide
that information to the court. Belton, supra note 8, at 1218. See also Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S.

635, 640-41 (1980).
71. See text accompanying note 60 supra for a list of evidentiary sources from which plaintiffs can possibly garner proof of discriminatory intent. Real and testimonial evidence from these
sources will most likely remain in the possession of the official decisionmakers.
72. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 241 (1976).
73. See text accompanying notes 69-71 supra. See also Mount Healthy City Bd. of Educ. v.
Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 284-87 (1977).
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basis of race. 74 The arrangement also chills the efforts of minority
groups to challenge the official actions that they perceive as the reason
for their discriminatory treatment. The Washington,Arlington Heights,
and Feeney decisions create a difficult burden for the minority plaintiff
75
who seeks relief from the injurious impact of government action.
III. DISPROPORTIONATE IMPACT LEFT UNREMEDIED

Placing the burden of proving intentional discrimination on plaintiffs enhances the possibility that serious and injurious effects of gov-

ernment action that fall disproportionately on minority groups will go
74. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 247-48 (1976). The Washington Court refused to
extend the impact standard (applied in the Title VII case of Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S.
424 (1971)) to the review of the constitutional claims. More deference to the "seemingly reasonable acts of [government] administrators and executives ...

is appropriate ...

where racial im-

pact, without discriminatory purpose, is claimed." 426 U.S. at 247. Allowing a prima facie case to
be established by claims that fail to demonstrate illicit purpose would create an overly intrusive
rule that reaches too far to invalidate many government programs "designed to serve neutral
ends" but which happen to be "more burdensome to the poor and the average black than to the
more affluent white." Id. at 248. But see Belton, supra note 8, at 1281 (although judges are reluctant to intrude into the government decisionmaking process, they have also recognized that the
process can mask discriminatory purpose).
75. Some scholars have noted that the Washington and Arlington Heights intent test are not
in accord with the spirit of the equal protection guarantee. Professor Eisenberg described his
discomfort as the result of an "intuitive feeling" that the courts should invalidate some government decisions solely because of the impact of those decisions. Eisenberg, DisproportionateImpact
and Illicit Motive: Theories of ConstitutionalAdjudication,52 N.Y.U.L. REv. 36, 42, 46, 47 (1977).

Professor Brest writes:
If courts may grant relief only when plaintiffs have made a clear case on the record,
many instances will remain where race-dependent decisions are strongly suspected but
cannot be proved. Although this is not essentially different from the difficulty facing the
proponents in most litigation seeking to overturn government policies, it is especially
troubling in the race area. The accumulation of suspected but unproved race-dependent
conduct, such as decisions to zone out low income housing, may systematically deprive
minorities of important benefits. And the very existence of a state of affairs which "everyone knows" is based on racial discrimination but no one will remedy is demoralizing
and stigmatic.
Brest, Foreword-In Defense oftheAntidiscriminationPrinciple, 90 HARV. L. REv. 1, 28-29 (1976).
Other authors have criticized the Court's fear of an unencumbered effects test, see, e.g.,
Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 248 n.14 (1976), and have pointed for support to the reasonable results of the effects standard used in employment discrimination cases arising under Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (1976), and in voting rights cases
arising under the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971-1973 (1976). See Fiss, Groups and
the Equal Protection Clause, 5 PHILOSOPHY & Pun. AFF. 107, 146 n.62 (1976); Schwemm, supra

note 8, at 992-1000 ("the only justification advanced to support the Court's conclusion [in Washington V.Davis] was an unrealistic fear of a purely theoretical danger"). But see Perry,supra note
51, at 563-66 (discussing the impracticability of a pure disproportionate impact test and the need
to balance the affected private interests with the underlying public interests). See also Freeman,
Legitimizing RacialDiscriminationThrough AntidiscriminationLaw: A CriticalReview of Supreme

Court Doctrine, 62 U. MINN. L. REv. 1049, 1082-88 (1978); Kleven, supra note 70, at 797-807.
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unremedied under Title VI. 76 One group of recent Title VI cases involves unsuccessful challenges to closings of public hospitals or reductions in their services. 77 The impact of this type of government
planning could be covered by the Title VI bar of discrimination in fed-

erally funded projects, but the use of the constitutional standard of intent has frustrated this statutory relief. The hospital closing cases serve
as excellent examples of the types of disproportionate and injurious ef-

fects of government action that may remain unremedied under the intent interpretation of Title VI.
Congress did not anticipate the problems associated with hospital
closings or relocations in its consideration of the policy goals that
prompted the passage of Title VI in 1964. 78 Significant changes, however, have taken place in the allocation of health care resources and the

79
involvement of the federal government in health care since that time.

These developments, along with the existence and apparent permanence of the urban ghetto,80 have made the public hospital an important institution for the cities' low income and minority communities.
Without a public health-care facility, access to medical services for residents of the urban ghetto is severely restricted."' Officials' plans to
close, reduce, or relocate medical services accentuate public awareness
of the crucial role of the hospital in the community. Frequently conflict rages over the perceived and real injuries of the plan.8 2 In an in76. That is, the injurious effects of government action will go unremedied in the courts. See
Belton, supra note 8, at 1224-25. No interpretation of Title VI precludes minority groups and their
supporters from uniting to promote legislative change.
77. See, e.g., NAACP v. Medical Center, Inc., 657 F.2d 1322 (3d Cir. 1981); Bryan v. Koch,
627 F.2d 612 (2d Cir. 1980); Jackson v. Conway, 620 F.2d 680 (8th Cir. 1980); United States v.
Bexar County, 484 F. Supp. 855 (W.D. Tex. 1980). See generally materials cited in note 4 supra.
78. See Wing, Title VI and Health Facilities.: Forms Without Substance, 30 HASTINGS L.J.
137, 147-54 (1978); Note, NAACP v. Medical Center, Inc., supra note 4, at 586-88. See text accompanying notes 12-18, 34-39 supra.
79. The most significant expansion of the federal role in health care was the creation of
Medicare, 42 U.S.C. § 1395 (1976), and Medicaid, 42 U.S.C. § 1396 (1976), financial assistance
programs that reimburse medical expenses of eligible elderly and indigent individuals. See generally DOING BETTER AND FEELING WORSE: HEALTH IN THE UNITED STATES (J. Knowles ed.
1977); Rosenblatt, Health Care Reform andAdministrativeLaw: A StructuralApproach, 88 YALE
L.J. 243 (1978).

80. See generally REPORT OF

THE NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS

236-73 (N.Y. Times ed. 1968).
81. Problems FacingFinancially Troubled Hospitals: FieldHearingsBefore the Subcomm. on
Health of the House Comm. on Ways andMeans, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 191 (1980) (statement of
Prof. Alan Sager) (hereinafter cited as Field Hearings); Deuschle, *hat is the Role of the Ghetto
Hospitalin Health Care Delivery?, in MEDICINE IN THE GHETTO 153 (J. Norman ed. 1969). See
also A. FORD, URBAN HEALTH INAMERICA (1976); AmQdeo, The Closingand DivestitureofPublic
Hospitals: PublicResponsibilityforHealth Care of Indigents, 9 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 174 (1975).
82. See, eg., Sullivan, RangelSees Racist Parallelsin Koch's Stand on Hospital,N.Y. Times,
May 22, 1980, § 2, at 3, col. 5 (discussing Bryan v. Koch, 627 F.2d 612 (2d Cir. 1980)). The district
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creasing number of these situations, relief is sought in federal8 3 or
85
state 84 courts or through administrative channels.
Even though no one-white or black-can use a hospital once it is
closed, these closings threaten minority interests. Usually, the closed
hospital disproportionately served blacks and hispanics 86 and the new
87
hospital is located in a predominantly white middle-class suburb.
Taking away public services frustrates the eligible individual's entitlement to Medicaid or Medicare 88 and abandons individuals who are
neither privately insured nor eligible for government aid to the unregulated decisions of private providers.8 9 Nationwide, there is evidence
court in Bryan found the plaintiff's challenge "frivolous" and an "effort. . . to use the federal
courts as a last resort for delaying if not preventing" the city's decision. Bryan v. Koch, 492 F.
Supp. 212,229,217 (S.D.N.Y.), aJ'd,627 F.2d 612 (2d Cir. 1980). Cf. Pride v. Community School
Bd., 488 F.2d 321, 328 (2d Cir. 1973) (the court recognized the anger and frustration experienced
by the plaintiffs, but refused to recognize as an injury the feelings of inferiority the plaintiff's
children would feel if the court held for the defendants).
83. Spivey v. Barry, 501 F. Supp. 1093 (D.D.C. 1980), rev'd, No. 80-2511, (D.C. Cir. Sept. 9,
1981); Jackson v. New York Health & Hosp. Corp., 419 F. Supp. 809 (S.D.N.Y. 1976); See cases
cited in note 77 supra.
84. See, eg., Concerned Citizens Comm. Interested in the Tehama Gen. Hosp. v. Board of
Supervisors, 78 Cal. App. 3d 603, 144 Cal. Rptr. 300 (1978); Preston v. City of Philadelphia, 26 Pa.
Commw. Ct. 106, 362 A.2d 452 (1976); 11 CLEARINGHOUSE REv. 740 (1977) (summarizing Huron
Community Health Comm. v. Fresno County Bd. of Supervisors, No. 217737-6 (Cal. Super. Ct.,
Sept. 2, 1977)); NAA CP FightsPlan to Close Hospital,HOSPITALS, June 1, 1971, at 124 (regarding
the proposed closing of Margaret Hague Maternity Hosp., Jersey City, New Jersey).
85. Federal administrative agency investigations were involved in NAACP v. Wilmington
Medical Center, Inc., 491 F. Supp. 290 (D. Del. 1980), aff'd, 657 F.2d 1322 (3d Cir. 1981); Bryan v.
Koch, 492 F. Supp. 212 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 627 F.2d 612 (2d Cir. 1980); Jackson v. Conway, 476 F.
Supp. 896 (E.D. Mo. 1979), af'd, 620 F.2d 680 (8th Cir. 1980). A state administrative hearing was
the forum for a challenge by the black residents of East Saint Louis to a closing of a private nonprofit hospital. See 13 CLEARINGHOUSE REv. 114 (1979) (summarizing Sylvester v. Southwestern
Ill. Health Facilities, No. 78-0178-H-082 (Ill. Health Facilities Planning Bd., filed 1979)). "
86. See, e.g., Bryan v. Koch, 492 F. Supp. 212 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 627 F.2d 612 (2d Cir. 1980);
13 CLEARINGHOUSE REV., supra note 85, at 114. Cf. United States v. Bexar County, 484 F. Supp.
855 (W.D. Tex. 1980) (the services being closed in Bexar County were maternity and gynecological care; the suit was brought on behalf of women who used the services).
87. See, eg., NAACP v. Wilmington Medical Center, Inc., 491 F. Supp. 290 (D. DeL 1980),
af'd, 627 F.2d 1322 (3d Cir. 1981); United States v. Bexar County, 484 F. Supp. 855 (W.D. Tex.
1980); 13 CLEARINGHOUSE REv., supra note 85, at 114.
88. See Note, NAACP v. Medical Center, Inc., supra note 4, at 590. See also 45 C.F.R.
§ 80.3(b)(1)(iv) (1980) ("A recipient under any program [of federal assistance] ... may not...
on ground of race, color, or national origin: . .. Restrict an individual in any way in the enjoyment of any advantage or privilege enjoyed by others receiving any service . . . under the
program").
89. See, eg., Bryan v. Koch, 627 F.2d 612, 626 n.8 (2d Cir. 1980) (Kearse, J., dissenting);
Spivey v. Barry, 501 F. Supp. 1093, 1105-06 (D.D.C. 1980), rev'd,No. 80-2511 (D.C. Cir. Sept. 9,
1981); Supplemental Reply Brief for Appellant at 4-5, Bryan v. Koch, 627 F.2d 612 (2d Cir. 1980).
See also Friedman, Publichospitals: Is "relevance" in the eye ofthe beholder?,HOSPITALS, May 1,
1980, at 83. To illustrate the general reluctance of the private sector to deal with non-paying
patients, Ms. Friedman quotes John Sbarbaro, M.D., Assistant Commissioner of Health, City of
Denver.
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that the percentage of minority population in an area is directly correlated with the probability of a hospital closing in or relocating out of
that area. 90
A.

The Impact of a Hospital Closing.

In contesting a hospital closing, plaintiffs typically present a detailed factual argument describing the nature and scope of the injury to
the minority community. A survey of the opinions in these cases indicates that courts have noted four kinds of impact associated with the
closing of hospitals: (1) the violation of expectation interests based on
the previous enjoyment of access to a hospital; (2) the disruption of the
specific patterns of hospital use that match the ghetto residents' needs;
(3) the unreliability of the private sector's commitment to health care
for the city's minority poor; and (4) the adverse effects on health care
caused by increased inconvenience and travel time resulting from using
an alternate public facility.91 Combining the particular facts in the
hospital cases and a general social science understanding of the health
care needs of the ghetto resident 92 demonstrates the seriousness of the
disproportionate impact suffered by the minority community.
Hospital users form expectations that government will continue to
provide the services they now enjoy. In some ways, the experience of
having adequate and convenient hospital care and then losing it is
more psychologically painful than the continuous experience of being
without adequate care. 93 Moreover, taking away the hospital only
There are also many patients whom neither the private physician nor the private patient
want to have contact with [thus leaving them to public services]: the 'street person' who
comes in drunk and perhaps violent; the 'mental health hold' whom the police bring in;
the unique cultural or ethnic patient whose entire family may come with him and who
needs interpretive services; the aged criminal, who is taken not to jail, but to the hospital;
the criminal and the victim of crime, who are accompanied by the police; and the drug
abuser. Private patients don't want to be near these social ills, and I don't blame them.
Id. at 92.
90. FieldHearings,supra note 81, at 196.
91. For a discussion of these considerations, see text accompanying notes 93-126 infra.
92. See generally R. DUFF & A. HOLLINGSHEAD, SICKNESS AND SOCIETY (1968); K. KRAUSE,
POWER & ILLNESS: THE POLITICAL SOCIOLOGY OF HEALTH AND MEDICAL CARE (1977); D.
MECHANIC, MEDICAL SOCIOLOGY (2d ed. 1978).
93. Cf. L THIBAUT & H. KELLEY, THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF GROUPS (1959).

Thibaut

and Kelley, social psychologists, developed a concept of comparison level, Id. at 21-24, which they
use to explain an individual's evaluation of the outcomes of a relationship. New outcomes are
compared to salient past outcomes in the individual's experience. The comparison level determines the subjective quality or impact of the new outcome. "A person who has experienced superior outcomes, for example, in alternative relationships, will have a higher CL [comparison level]
and, therefore, will be less satisfied with the lower level in the present relationship than will another person who has known only the mediocrity of the present situation." Id. at 82.
This theoretical observation for individuals in dyadic relationships is easily extrapolated to
explain the feelings of individual members of a group in interaction with other groups. See S.
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from the minority section of the city arguably creates a more psychologically harmful stigma than the historical denial of services to the
94
minority section.
The courts have noted that both whites and minorities are deprived of a hospital's services when it closes and therefore have disSTOUFFER, L. DEI.INNEY, E. SUCHMAN, S. STARR & R. WILLIAMS, 1 STUDIES IN SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY IN WORLD WAR II, THE AMERICAN SOLDIER (1949). Stouffer and his associates found

that well-educated soldiers who had experienced better promotion outcomes and higher status
prior to joining the army were less satisfied with the army's promotion schedule than less welleducated soldiers who were accustomed to fewer opportunities and less status. Id. at 284-361. By
analogy, a community member who has experienced convenient and adequate access to health
care is injured more by denial of that access than the community member who has never had such
access. Cf. Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958) (state's action to force a local school system to
abandon alreadyprepared plans is a violation of equal protection); Resident Advisory Bd. v.
Rizzo, 425 F. Supp. 987 (E.D. Pa. 1976), (city acted with discriminatory intent in delaying and
frustrating the construction of a public housing project that had already begun (land was cleared
in 1960)), aff'd, 564 F.2d 126 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 908 (1978). But ef. Citizens
Comm. for Faraday Wood v. Lindsay, 362 F. Supp. 651 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (no discriminatory motive present in the refusal to process an application to obtain financing for the construction of
public housing), aff'd, 507 F.2d 1065 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 948 (1975). The Citizens
Committee district court deferred to official decisionmakers, writing:
To hold that any action or failure to act is unconstitutional because it has an adverse
effect on minorities, even though it affects members of the majority as well-albeit to a
lesser degree-would be carrying the idea of discriminatory effect too far. Under such
an approach a governmental unit could never stop a program for entirely sound reasons
even at an early talking stage if it would deprive minorities of something they would
have had if the program came to fruition.
362 F. Supp. at 659. The observation of the district court cannot easily be explained away; nor
does this note purport to provide a conclusive answer to this warning. The Supreme Court echoed
the Citizens Committee court's concern in Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 248 & n.14 (1976),
in which the Court expressed the fear that an impact test would invalidate reasonable and unintentionally discriminatory official actions. See note 75 supra. A hospital closing, however, is not
the cancellation of a program yet to be started but rather the curtailment of a service upon which a
community has come to rely.
94. Arguably, expectation interests are always being bruised by government action. Nonetheless, plaintiffs might argue that they have suffered separate damage to those expectations based
on the enjoyment of services prior to the hospital closing. Other plaintiffs who challenge an institutionalized, disproportionate distribution of health care services could argue that they suffered
psychological injury by having less access to services but they could not claim injury from the loss
of benefits which they had previously enjoyed. Cf. Jackson v. Conway, 476 F. Supp. 896, 904
(E.D. Mo. 1979) (distinguishing a hospital closing case from the municipal services cases in which
services are provided to white areas but not to minority areas), aj'd,620 F.2d 680 (8th Cir. 1980).
In City of Memphis v. Greene, 451 U.S. 100, 139-40 (1981) (Marshall, Brennan, Blackmun, J.J.,
dissenting), Justice Marshall recognizes the "psychological effect" on the minority community of
the city's decision to erect a barrier prohibiting access along a street running from a white to a
black neighborhood. The barrier does not represent a "slight inconvenience," id. at 138; rather, it
"'serve[s] as a monument to racial hostility' ", id. at 140 (quoting testimony). See generally The
Supreme Court, 1976 Term, 91 HARv. L. REv. 70, 174-76 (1977) (suggesting an equal protection
standard that would ask "whether a reasonable member of the affected minority group would be
stigmitized by the challenged decision." Id. at 174).
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counted any special injury to minorities. 95 One can question this
supposition of nominal equality of loss, however, in light of the
Supreme Court decision in Grffin v. County School Board.96 In Griffin
the Court carefully reviewed an official decision to close an entire
county public school system, noting evidence of state action endorsing
an alternative system of private schools in the county for whites only.97
Although other evidence also supported the holding of unconstitutional
discrimination, 98 the Court independently recognized the violation of
the minority plaintiffs' expectation interests resulting from the closing
of their school system while public schools in surrounding counties remained open. 99 A holding in favor of the official decisionmakers was
not guaranteed even though the denial of services affected both blacks
and whites in that county who attended public school.' °
95. When part of a municipal hospital system is relocated, everyone must travel to the new
location. E.g., NAACP v. Wilmington Medical Center, Inc., 491 F. Supp. 290, 320 (D. Del. 1980),
af'd,657 F.2d 1322 (3d Cir. 1981); United States v. Bexar County, 484 F. Supp. 855, 859 n.4
(W.D. Tex. 1980).
96. 377 U.S. 218 (1963).
97. Id. at 229-30.
98. Id. at 222. The county's decision to close its schools was also in reaction to a court order
to integrate the schools. Cf. Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217 (1971) (City of Jackson, Mississippi, reacting to a federal court order to integrate public recreational facilities, closed all of its
public swimming pools). The Palmer Court distinguished Grjffin as also involving state action in
support of alternative segregated private schools. Id. at 219, 221-23.
99. 377 U.S. at 230-31. See Horowitz & Neitring, EqualProtection.4spectsof Inequalitiesin
PublicEducationandPublicAssistance ProgramsFromPlaceto Place Within a State, 15 U.C.L.A.
L. REv. 787, 801-03 (1968). Horowitz and Neitring speculate that
more broadly viewed, [Griffln supports]... the principle that territorial inequalities of
certain types within a state will be held violative of equal protection upon consideration
of the magnitude of impact of the territorial classification on the individual adversely
affected and the justification for the classification, and that local option-expressing local
response to social, moral, economic, and political factors. . . is not, in itself, a controlling consideration which establishes adequate constitutional justification for the classification.
Id. at 803. The decision to close the most obsolete hospital in a community is arguably a territorial decision when the decision inevitably affects the downtown-ghetto hospital. Evidence of reasonable foreseeability of impact, however, is not by itself proof of discriminatory intent. See
Personnel Adm'r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 & n.25 (1979).
The Griffin situation may also arise when a county decides to close all public hospital services. See, e.g., Concerned Citizens Comm. Interested in the Tehama Gen. Hosp. v. Board of
Supervisors, 78 Cal. App. 3d 603 (opinion omitted), 144 Cal. Rptr. 300, 304-05 (1978); HOSPITALs,
supra note 84, at 124.
100. Cf. United States v. Palmer, 356 F.2d 951, 952 (5th Cir. 1966) (court dismissed the defendant's assertion that closing voter registration offices to both blacks and whites does not constitute discrimination "in a parish where most white persons of voting age are registered and most
Negroes of voting age are not registered. . . .'There is no greater inequality than the equal treatment of unequals."' (quoting Dennis v. United States, 339 U.S. 162, 184 (1950)). Professor Eisenberg points out that "given the relative socioeconomic status of blacks and whites, one cannot
help but feel that even though closing a public facility injures whites, it usually does not hurt them
as much as it hurts blacks." Eisenberg, supra note 75, at 109 n.344. But see Palmer v. Thompson,
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The second kind of impact evidence addresses the actual medical
needs of inner city residents and the impact that closing a public hospital has on their access to medical care. For example, in NAACP v. Wilmington Medical Center,Inc. 101 the district court reviewed the needs of
minority groups, the elderly, and the disabled 0 2 -- groups disproportionately represented in the patient population of the downtown Wlmington hospital. 0 3 The medical center proposed to move many
specialty services, including maternity services, to a new hospital in the
Wilmington suburbs. The plaintiffs argued that the move disproportionately affected minorities because minority women and children
have a greater incidence of high-risk pregnancies and births than white
women and children. 1°4 The court concluded that under the medical
center's plan, services were to be moved "9.35 miles farther from the
populations that need them most.' 10 5 The plan called for an overall
improvement in medical care for the community but the plaintiffs argued that the relocation of services would actually decrease the com403 U.S. 217, 226 (1971) (holding that a local government's decision to close all of its municipal
swimming pools, rather than allowing integrated use, did not violate the equal protection clause).
In NAACP v. Medical Center, Inc., 657 F.2d 1322, 1352 (3d Cir. 1981) (Gibbons, J., concurring and dissenting), Judge Gibbons writes that he, unlike the majority, cannot find consolation in
the district court's determination that the relocation of hospital services to the suburbs and out of
the inner city will improve the level of care for all population groups. The judge's doubts arise
from the majority's reliance on the medical center's speculative promises to plan for significant
renovation of the city facility. Id. at 1347, 1351-52. If the renovation is not carried out, all users
will be disappointed, but the impact on the minority community would be greater because the
other branch of the hospital is much more accessible to the suburban white population. The
ghetto hospital closing also injures the expectations of minorities to a greater extent than the
expectations of whites because private sources of health care and even other public hospitals located outside of the ghetto remain open to provide services to the higher income and suburban
white population.
101. 491 F. Supp. 290 (D. Del. 1980), aj'd, 657 F.2d 1322 (3d Cir. 1981).
102. Id. at 306-08. See also Greater Washington, D.C. Area Council of Senior Citizens v.
District of Columbia Gov't, 406 F. Supp. 768 (D.D.C. 1975).
103. 491 F. Supp. at 302-04.
104. Id. at 306-07. "[W]hile minorities comprise only 13% of the New Castle County population, they represent 33% of the patient days in pediatrics, 24% of the patient days in obstetrics, and
45.9% of the patient days in the premature nursery." Id. at 306. Socio-economic factors that help
to explain this conclusion include: more pregnancies among minority teenage women; tendency
of adolescents not to seek out prenatal care; and more pregnancies among older minority women
and minority women in their fourth or more pregnancy. Id. at 306-07. See United States v. Bexar
County, 484 F. Supp. 855, 859-60 (V.D. Tex. 1980) (Bexar County planned to relocate obstetrical
and nursery facilities to the suburbs despite the disproportionate need for those services among
residents of the inner city); A. FORD, supra note 81, at 66-67; HEALTH REOURCES ADMINISTEATION, HEALTH OF THE DISADVANTAGED: CHART BOOK-Il 35-40 (1980).
105. 491 F. Supp. at 308. The Wilmington MedicalCenter court held that the various negative
effects of the hospital service relocation were not sufficient to establish a prima facie case under an
impact standard interpretation of Title VI. Id. at 333-37. The court acknowledged the significance of the impact but reasoned that "the negative effects are only insignificant when compared
to the vast improvements in the quality of care [under the medical center's plan]." Id. at 337.
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munity's level of health: distance and inconvenience would discourage
regular users and even high-risk users from seeking needed medical

attention. 106
The emergency room of the urban public hospital also meets the
particular needs of some inner-city users. In Bryan v. Koch 10 7 the court
recognized the emergency medical care needs of the community, ob-

serving that "at least a small number of patients, those admitted to the
emergency room because of gunshot or knife wounds or drug overdoses, would suffer adverse consequences if the nearest emergency

room treatment were at even slightly more distant locations."' 0 8 The
public hospital emergency room also provides extensive services for
non-emergency patients.10 9 The district court in Wilmington Medical
Center correctly observed that the hospital clinic and emergency room

are "used by the poor in much the same way as more affluent people
use the services of a private physician."" l0 Closing a public hospital
sharply reduces the availability of both emergency and primary health
care for the ghetto community that relies on the hospital to meet the
106. Id. See text accompanying notes 144, 147 infra regarding the presumption of rational
services users, and see text accompanying notes 122-26 infra regarding the effects of alternate
transportation requirements.
107. 627 F.2d 612 (2d Cir. 1980). The New York City Health and Hospital Corporation made
an administrative decision to close Metropolitan and Sydenham Hospitals in Harlem. Plaintiffs
challenged the decision to close Sydenham through both political and judicial channels. The
plaintiffs lost in the courts but negotiations resulted in the termination of municipal responsibility
for the hospital and a plan to reopen the facility as a community-operated drug, alcohol, and
mental health facility. N.Y. Times, July 13, 1980, § 1, at 31, col. 3.
108. 627 F.2d at 617. Furthermore, plaintiffs' evidence showed that 70% of emergency room
patients arrive by foot or are carried by others to the hospital; 85% of all drug overdose victims
arrive in this manner. Brief for Plaintiffs at 12, 51, Bryan v. Koch, 627 F.2d 612 (2d Cir. 1980). In
light of the closing's adverse impact on these emergency patients, the Bryan court found it "appropriate" to assess the defendant's reasons for closing the hospital. 627 F.2d at 617. The court
concluded that sufficient justification for closing on the basis of neutral criteria had been presented
and held for the defendants. Id. at 620-21.
The medical demands resulting from violence, alcoholism, and drug addiction are disproportionately placed on the urban public hospital. See A. FORD, supra note 81, at 58-67; D. MECHANic, supra note 92, at 169-72; Rodstein, Crime and theAged, 234 J.A.M.A. 533 (1975). Plaintiffs in
Bryan argued, in addition, that the public hospital needs extra beds for certain types of patients
who cannot care for themselves, e.g., drug addicts and psychotic and senile patients. This use of
hospital beds may be inappropriate, but there is a chronic shortage of more appropriate services in
both the public and private sectors. Memorandum in Support of Preliminary Injunction for Plaintiff at 16, Bryan v. Koch, 492 F. Supp. 212 (S.D.N.Y.), aft'd, 627 F.2d 612 (2d Cir. 1980).
109. See generally Tetelman, Public Hospitais-Criticalor Recovering?, 88 HEALTH SERVICES
REP. 295, 298 (1973); Torrens & Yedvab, VariationsAmong Emergency Room Populations."A
Comparison of FourHosfpitals in New York Ciy, 8 MED. CARE 60 (1970).
110. 491 F. Supp. at 297; accord, Bryan v. Koch, 627 F.2d 612, 629 n.9 (2d Cir. 1980) (Kearse,
J., dissenting).
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specific needs of its members."'

The third kind of impact associated with the closing of a public
hospital is on the access of members of the affected groups to health
care in the private sector. Private health providers may already be

scarce in the low income community,' 1 2 and once the public facility is

closed, private physicians may leave the area altogether. 1 3 In the Wil-

mington Medical Center case, the plaintiffs contended that the opening
of a new hospital would draw private physicians away from the neighborhood surrounding the old hospital and into the suburbs near the

new facility. 14 The doctors' relocation would reduce the availability of
medical care in the city-both by a reduction of the staff of the old
hospital' 15 and by a reduction in the number of physicians practicing in
the community. 1 6 The private sector's reaction to a hospital closing
can affect access to health care in a community as much as the closing
7

itself."1
The role of the private hospital in the community's health care

system differs from that of the government-operated hospital. The private voluntary or for-profit hospital generally has a consumer orientation, providing services on the basis of profitability and extent of
111. In Jackson v. New York City Health and Hosp. Corp., 419 F. Supp. 809 (S.D.N.Y. 1976),
the evidence showed that no more than 20% of the cases treated in the Morrisania Hospital emergency room were actual emergencies. The court reasoned that closing this public hospital would
have less of an impact because so few patients presented true emergencies. The court ignored the
probability, however, that the remaining patients who used the Morrisania emergency room
would be without access to primary care if the city closed the hospital. Id. at 811-12. See also
Wise, Medicine and Poverty, in ETHICAL ISSUES IN MEDICINE 347, 352-56, (F. Torrey ed. 1968)
(discussing Morrisania Hospital and health care in the minority community).
112. See, e.g., Bryan v. Koch, 627 F.2d 612, 626 n.9 (2d Cir. 1980) (Kearse, J. dissenting) ("the
United States as a whole has slightly more than one doctor for every 500 people, Harlem has only
one doctor for every 4000 people"). Also, access to minimally integrated facilities does not guarantee equal treatment for minorities. See R. DUFF & A. HOLLINGSHEAD, supra note 92, at 107-50;
A. FORD, supra note 81, at 97-98; S. HARRIS, THE ECONOMICS OF HEALTH CARE 422-27 (1975); K.
KRAUSE, supra note 92, at 100-02; Haynes & McGarvey, Physicians Hospitals,andPatientsin the
Inner City, in MEDICINE IN THE GHETTO 117, 119 (J. Norman ed. 1969).
113. See Field Hearings,supra note 81, at 199.
114. 491 F. Supp. at 309. But see id. at 329 (the court noted that private physicians will continue to locate their offices near their patients). See generally Memorandum in Support of Preliminary Injunction for Plaintiff at 12-13, Bryan v. Koch, 492 F. Supp. 212 (S.D.N.Y.), ai'd, 627 F.2d
612 (2d Cir. 1980); P. DEVISE, MISUSED AND MISPLACED HOSPITALS AND DOCTORS: A LOCATIONAL ANALYSIS OF THE URBAN HEALTH CARE CRISIS 14 (1973); FieldHearings,supra note 81,
at 199.
115. 491 F. Supp. at 309, 329.
116. Id. at 309.
117. In addition, some plaintiffs have contended that the lack of hospital facilities makes it
more difficult to attract doctors to practice in a community or to work at outpatient clinics. Memorandum in Support of Preliminary Injunction for Plaintiff at 22, Bryan v. Koch, 492 F. Supp. 212
(S.D.N.Y.), ajld,627 F.2d 612 (2d Cir. 1980).
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demand by paying or insured patients.' 18 Although private hospitals
may benefit from the closing of a public hospital competitor, they eschew responsibility for the comprehensive provision of care for all
types of health-related problems in the community." 9 Furthermore,
the residents have no guarantee that the private hospital will remain; a
private provider may decide to close or move to the suburbs120 for
many of the same reasons that prompt a city official's decision. 12' The
impact of closing a public hospital must be assessed in light of the services offered by alternative private providers and the private hospital's
commitment to maintaining a presence in the community.
In every hospital closing case, plaintiffs maintain that the remaining sources of medical care are inadequate substitutes for the public
services being closed or relocated. Considerations relating to the fourth
kind of impact surface in the debate over the ability of the remaining
public services to meet the health needs of the minority community. In
most cases, the issue of alternatives turns on the effects of longer travel
times and the accompanying inconveniences. Most courts have agreed
with defendants that if public or private transportation is adequate to
get patients to one hospital it will be adequate to get them to another. 22 Differences in travel time are deemed to have only a minimal
effect on the delivery of services.123 Plaintiffs successfully argued, however, in Spivey v. Barry,124 that increased travel time discourages the
118. One writer has suggested that those health-care providers who stay in the ghetto act like
good businessmen. They offer certain routine services but have eliminated unprofitable facilities
such as maternity wards and fully-equipped emergency rooms. Slom, Hospitalin Slum Turns a
Profitby ProvidingBasic Carefor the Poor, Wall St. J., Oct. 21, 1977, at 1,col. 1.
119. See Brown, The PublicHospital,HOSPITALS, July 1, 1970, at 40, 42; Friedman, supra note
89, at 83-85.
120. E.g., NAACP v. Wilmington Medical Center, Inc., 491 F. Supp. 290, 294-99 (D. Del.
1980) (the medical center is a privately owned, non-profit corporation that receives federal funds
under Medicare and Medicaid; the lawsuit was brought under Title VI to enjoin the medical
center from curtailing its services in the inner city as a part of its plan to transfer its operation to
the suburbs), afi'd,657 F.2d 1322 (3d Cir. 1981); 13 CLEARNGHOUSE REV., supra note 85, at 114.
121. See text accompanying notes 137-43 infra.
122. See, e.g., United States v. Bexar County, 484 F. Supp. 855, 859 n.4 (W.D. Tex. 1980)
("[Tihe plaintiffs' claims of inaccessibility... are discounted by evidence that an overwhelming
majority of all patients arriving at the . . . [new hospital in the suburbs] did so by private
automobile").
123. See Bryan v. Koch, 492 F. Supp. 212, 223 n.13 (S.D.N.Y.), a d, 627 F.2d 612 (2d Cir.
1980); Jackson v. Conway, 476 F. Supp. 896, 903104 (E.D. Mo. 1979), afd,620 F.2d 680 (8th Cir.
1980). Seealso NAACP v. Wilmington Medical Center, Inc., 491 F. Supp. 290, 305-06, 319-24 (D.
Del. 1980) (a plan to provide free shuttle bus transportation between facilities will meet hospitalrelated transportation demand), aft'd, 657 F.2d 1322 (3d Cir. 1981).
124. 501 F. Supp. 1093, 1104-05 (D.D.C. 1980) (users of the Upshur Street Clinic in Washington, D.C. argued successfully that the District of Columbia's decision to close the clinic was a
violation of their statutory rights under several District of Columbia statutes), rev'd, No. 80-2511
(D.C. Cir. Sept. 9, 1981).

Vol. 1981:1033]

TITLE VI

1055

medically underserved from seeking services and that persons will wait
until a health problem becomes serious and debilitating before traveling farther to a substitute clinic. 125 The Spivey court agreed that the
cost of care would increase and the chances for effective treatment
would decrease because of the city's closing of the only health clinic in
126
the minority neighborhood.
B.

The Failureto Prove Intent.
If a court determines the questions of fact on all four of these impact issues in the plaintiff's favor, the aggregate finding represents a
substantial adverse and disproportionate impact on the minority community. Plaintiffs protesting hospital closings, however, have not yet
presented persuasive evidence to meet the burden of proving racially
discriminatory intent. In part, the plaintiffs' inability to show intent is
the result of their non-participation in the decisionmaking process.
Plaintiffs may attempt to show a departure from the normal official
decisionmaking process,127 or the use of mistaken or inappropriate criteria,1 28 but the courts have accepted defendants' evidence of circumstantial exigencies to rebut the inference of intent based on the
departure from standard procedures. 129 In defense, official decisionmakers have been able to show cooperation with community
groups, 30 compromise on some issues,' 3' and that average access to
125. Id. at 1099, 1105. The court remarked:
Without the availability of [geographically accessible] comprehensive clinical care, many
indigent patients:
a. do not receive adequate preventive care, and therefore encounter complications and
require more costly care later,
b. must utilize hospital emergency rooms for care, which is expensive; and
c. only receive care in a sporadic and fragmented manner, and do not receive care with
the necessary continuity and coordination between various doctors, providers, and
services.

Each of these problems has been posed by the closing of Upshur Street.
Id. at 1099. But see NAACP v. Wilmington Medical Center, Inc., 491 F. Supp. 290, 332 (D. Del.
(1980) ("This Court ... simply cannot believe that people will forego treatment for cancer, diagnosis or treatment for a neurological disorder, or care. . . merely because of a twenty-five minute
increase in travel to and from the hospital in each direction"), af'd, 657 F.2d 1322 (3d Cir. 1981).
See also A. FoPtn, supra note 81, at 96.
126. 501 F. Supp. at 1095-97.
127. See Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 267
(1977).
128. See Resident Advisory Bd. v. Rizzo, 564 F.2d 126, 143 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435
U.S. 908 (1978).
129. Eg., NAACP v. Wilmington Medical Center, Inc., 491 F. Supp. 290, 313 n.181 (D. Del.
1980), af'd, 657 F.2d 1322 (3d Cir. 1981).
130. E.g., Bryan v. Koch, 492 F. Supp. 212, 228-29 (S.D.N.Y.), afl'd, 627 F.2d 612 (2d Cir.
1980); NAACP v. Wilmington Medical Center, Inc., 491 F. Supp. 290, 299-302 (D. Del. 1980),
affd, 657 F.2d 1322 (1981).
131. Eg., Bryan v. Koch, 492 F. Supp. 212,227 (S.D.N.Y.), arT'd, 627 F.2d 612 (2d Cir. 1980).
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medical care will improve for the entire population over which they
have jurisdiction. 32 Attempts to prove discriminatory intent have
failed 33 because the decisionmaking process, which the public does not
view,' 34 generates most of the potential evidence of intent.1 35
Even if intent can be demonstrated, the courts have signaled their
deference to the government's defense of legitimate objectives for its
hospital-closing decisions. Such decisions are always justifiable and
the justifications offered are generally true or substantially true. 36
Reasons that decisionmakers give include: severe budget constraints
forcing cities to cut public expenditures; 37 the failure of payments
under Medicare and Medicaid to cover total hospital costs of those eligible for assistance; 38 the excessive cost of renovation and maintenance of old and deteriorating facilities in the central city-now the
low-income slums;' 39 the mismatch of overall user needs with the pres132. E.g., NAACP v. Wilmington Medical Center, Inc., 491 F. Supp. 290, 311 (D. Del. 1980),
aft'd, 657 F.2d 1322 (3d Cir. 1981); United States v. Bexar County, 484 F. Supp. 855, 860 (W. D.
Tex. 1980); Jackson v. Conway, 476 F. Supp. 896, 905 (E.D. Mo. 1979), aft'd, 620 F.2d 680 (8th
Cir. 1980).
133. See Bryan v. Koch, 627 F.2d 612, 616 (2d Cir. 1980); NAACP v. Wilmington Medical
Center, Inc., 491 F. Supp. 290, 313 & n.181 (D. Del. 1980), af'd, 657 F.2d 1322 (3d Cir. 1981);
United States v. Bexar County, 484 F. Supp. 855, 859 (WV.D. Tex. 1980).
134. Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 265 (1977);
Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 253 (1976) (Stevens, J., concurring). See generally Note, Reading the Mind ofthe SchoolBoard,supra note 62, at 332-37 (the author proposes a separate concept
of "institutional intent" based on an identification and evaluation of institutional policies). See
also J. MARCH & H. SIMON, ORGANIZATIONS 136-71 (1958); Lindblom, The Science of "Muddling
Through", 19 PUB. AD. REV. 79 (1959).
135. But see NAACP v. Medical Center, Inc., 657 F.2d 1322, 1336 (3d Cir. 1981) (the requirement that plaintiffs prove that feasible, less discriminatory alternatives to the medical center's plan
exist is not unreasonable because of the extensive discovery available to the plaintiffs).
136. Reliance on inaccurate statistics and misinformation has been raised, however, in hospital-closing litigation. See, e.g., Spivey v. Barry, 501 F. Supp. 1093, 1102-03 (D.D.C. 1980), rep'd,
No. 80-2511 (D.C. Cir. Sept. 9, 1981); Letter from Coalition of Concerned Harlem Citizens and
Organizations for Health to Patricia Harris, Secretary, Department of Health, Education, and
Welfare 5 (August 20, 1979) (arguing that health statistics on a block-by-block basis rather than
on a health-district basis are more appropriate for making hospital closing decisions).
137. See, e.g., Bryan v. Koch, 627 F.2d 612, 614 (2d Cir. 1980); Spivey v. Barry, 501 F. Supp.
1093, 1103 (D.D.C. 1980), rev'd, No. 80-2511 (D.C. Cir. Sept. 9, 1981); United States v. Bexar
County, 484 F. Supp. 855, 858 (W. D. Tex. 1980); Greater Washington, D.C. Area Council of
Senior Citizens v. District of Columbia Gov't, 406 F. Supp. 768, 770 (D.D.C. 1975); Koch, Closing
Sydenham, N.Y. Times, June 4, 1980, § 1, at 31, col. 1.
138. See, e.g., Trial Memo for Defendants at 31, Bryan v. Koch, 492 F. Supp. 212 (S.D.N.Y.),
a 'd, 627 F.2d 612 (2d Cir. 1980); Koch, supra note 137, at 31.
139. See, e.g., Bryan v. Koch, 627 F.2d 612, 618 (2d Cir. 1980); Spivey v. Barry, 501 F. Supp.
1093, 1102 (D.D.C. 1980), rev'd, No. 80-2511 (D.C. Cir. Sept. 9, 1981); NAACP v. Wilmington
Medical Center, Inc., 491 F. Supp. 290, 298, 301-02 (D. Del. 1980); a 'd, 657 F.2d 1322 (3d Cir.
1981); Trial Memorandum for Defendants at 24-30, Post Trial Memorandum for Defendants at
63-65, Bryan v. Koch, 492 F. Supp. 212 (S.D.N.Y.), aft'd, 627 F.2d 612 (2d Cir. 1980). Plaintiffs
commonly allege, however, that high costs of renovation result from intentionally planned obso-
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ent arrangement of services; 140 low occupancy rates which generate un42
necessary costs;I 4' and the decertification of specific hospital services.1

In addition, evidence that the entire system can operate more efficiently
and less expensively if a facility is shut down, cut back, or relocated
143
will usually serve as an affirmative defense.
Deference to official justifications assumes that public-hospital systems must be guided by a cost-benefit model of priorities and that users
act in a rational manner in seeking health-care services. 44 In fact, the
disagreement over the validity of these assumptions is at the heart of all
of the complaints brought by affected minority groups.
Plaintiffs have raised three counter-arguments. First, they claim
that the public-sector hospital has a commitment to all of the commulescence. See Spivey v. Barry, 501 F. Supp. 1093, 1102 (D.D.C. 1980), rev'd, No. 80-2511 (D.C.
Cir. Sept. 9, 1981); United States v. Bexar County, 484 F. Supp. 855, 857 (W. D. Tex. 1980). The
possibility that past intentional discrimination is a consideration in an ostensibly neutral decision
to close a hospital supports a Title VI or equal protection challenge. J. Stolier, A Health Advocate's Guide to Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act and Section 504 of the Vocational Rehabilitation Act of 1973 at 18 (January 1979) (unpublished paper).
140. Defendants in Bryan argue that low income minority communities need outpatient facilities, not hospitals. Thus defendants claim that closing a hospital is not a curtailment of "needed"
services. Post Trial Memorandum for Defendants at 15, Bryan v. Koch, 492 F. Supp. 212
(S.D.N.Y.), ajf'd,627 F.2d 612 (2d Cir. 1980). They also contend that there is an excess of certain
services, as evidenced by the underutilization of the surgical facilities at Sydenham Hospital.
Trial Memorandum for Defendants at 23, Bryan v. Koch, 492 F. Supp. 212 (S.D.N.Y.), af d, 627
F.2d 612 (2d Cir. 1980). Another contention is that the public hospital "inappropriately houses"
the elderly who are chronically ill. Post Trial Memorandum for Defendants at 43, Bryan v. Koch,
492 F. Supp. 212 (S.D.N.Y.), aftd, 627 F.2d 612 (2d Cir. 1980). See generally Haggerty, What
Type ofMedical Care Can or Shouldbe Offered to the Urban Poor?,in MEDICINE INTHE GHETTO

251 (J. Norman ed. 1969).
141. See, e.g., Jackson v. Conway, 476 F. Supp. 896, 905 (E.D. Mo. 1979), afl'd, 620 F.2d 680
(8th Cir. 1980); Trial Memorandum for Defendants at 20, Bryan v. Koch, 492 F. Supp. 212
(S.D.N.Y.), aftd, 627 F.2d 612 (2d Cir. 1980); Koch, supra note 137, at 31.
142. See, e.g., Reply Post Trial Memorandum for Defendants at 37, Bryan v. Koch, 492 F.
Supp. 212 (S.D.N.Y.), aft'd, 627 F.2d 612 (2d Cir. 1980) (decertification of Sydenham Hospital
emergency department and removal of hospital from ambulance route indicates a decline in the
hospital's quality of care).
143. See generally Gottlieb, Reducing Excess Hospital Capacityis a Tough but Necessary Job,

HOsPITALS, Dec. 1, 1978, at 63. Such official decisions, however, are difficult to review. See
Bryan v. Koch, 492 F. Supp. 212, 220 (S.D.N.Y.), affid, 627 F.2d 612 (2d Cir. 1980). Government
planning is a complicated task. If the government decides as a matter of policy to close the most
obsolete and financially wasteful facility, as soon as that facility is closed another facility will fit
the same description. The problem of the system "carrying" the most inefficient unit does not
easily go away but, at the same time, a large system can always defend the closing of the presently
most inefficient unit in order to benefit the whole.
144. See, eg., United States v. Bexar County, 484 F. Supp. 855, 861 (W.D. Tex. 1980) ("[prospective mothers] will have both the ability and good judgment to act in their best interest as well
as that of their babies."). But see text accompanying notes 112-26 supra on the inadequacy of
substitute providers.
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nity that takes precedence over cost-benefit strategies.145 Second,
plaintiffs have marshalled evidence to demonstrate that closing a hospital is neither the only nor the best remedy to help solve fiscal
problems. 146 Finally, plaintiffs argue that users are not rational; individuals use a hospital for reasons other than to maximize the quality of
care received. Low-income users take advantage of medical services
more often when the services are accessible and when the users know
they will be treated regardless of their ability to pay. Because the reverse is often true in the ghetto, the poor generally make few visits to
doctors for primary or preventive care. As a consequence, when their
illnesses are treated, the illnesses are usually more severe than those of
people in higher income groups and they require more and longer visits
to the hospital. 147 Courts have been persuaded, however, by the official
justification. In Medical Center and Bryan, the courts assumed for the
sake of argument that the plaintiffs' evidence of impact established a
prima facie case, yet in both cases the courts concluded that the official
explanation was sufficient justification for the change in services,
notwithstanding the resulting injury to minority access to health
care. 148
IV.

CONCLUSION

A gap exists between intentional discrimination covered by Title
VI and the significant discriminatory impact resulting from official action or inaction. When a hospital closes, residents of the urban ghetto
suffer disproportionately reduced access to necessary medical care.
This problem is compounded by the absence of health-care alternatives
available to groups previously served by the closed public hospitals.
Even the most vigorous advocacy, however, will not establish a prima
facie case under Title VI unless the plaintiffs can present evidence of
145. See Post Hearing Memorandum for Plaintiffs at 161, Bryan v. Koch, 492 F. Supp. 212
(S.D.N.Y.), a'd, 627 F.2d 612 (2d Cir. 1980); Friedman, supra note 89, at 83; Amodeo, supra note
81, at 174-75. Cf. Preston v. City of Philadelphia, 26 Pa. Commw. Ct. 106, 362 A.2d 452 (1976)

(plaintiffs' challenge depended almost entirely on the historical commitment of local government
to public health care, implying that this traditional state function must be preserved). Also, a
community may develop pride in its local hospital and may for this reason resent the decision to
close. Judge ClearsHospital Closing in St. Louis, HOSPITALS, Oct. 16, 1979, at 20.

146. Eg., Post Hearing Memorandum for Plaintiffs at 145-46, Bryan v. Koch, 492 F. Supp.
212 (S.D.N.Y.), af'd, 627 F.2d 612 (2d Cir. 1980) (incremental savings can be realized from selec-

tive reductions of beds and consolidation of services). See generally Gottlieb, supra note 143, at
63.
147. See A. FoRD,supra note 81, at 100-07. See also text accompanying notes 101-11 supra
concerning the differential health needs of the urban low-income minority community.
148. NAACP v. Medical Center, Inc., 657 F.2d 1322, 1332-33 (3d Cir. 1981); Bryan v. Koch,
627 F.2d 612, 616-18 (2d Cir. 1980).
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discriminatory intent. Furthermore, this concern is not limited to the
hospital-closing or -relocation situation;' 4 9 because of increased budget
reductions, federal courts may soon hear a variety of benefits- and serv-

ices- reduction cases. 150 The expansion of government involvement in
the social service and health areas has created expectations and actual

reliance, and the beneficiaries of those services will suffer greatly when
that involvement is curtailed.

Congress enacted Title VI in 1964 to terminate the federal government's role as a provider of financial assistance to public and private

programs that operated in a discriminatory fashion. Congress intended
Title VI to confront the problem at hand in 1964: intentional discrimination in state and local policies and programs. Since Title VI was
enacted, however, the prevalence of official discriminatory purpose has
receded. At present, adverse impact on minority communities may re-

sult from facially neutral policies, and evidence of the requisite intent
will be either elusive or altogether absent. Title VI, which once ap-

peared to excise the federal government completely from actions and
decisions that maintained racial segregation, is now inadequate to disentangle the imprimatur of continued federal funding from other ac149. But see Jackson v. Conway, 476 F. Supp. 896, 904 (E.D. Mo. 1979) (distinguishing a
hospital closing case from the municipal services cases in which services are provided to white
areas but not to minority areas), aft'd, 620 F.2d 680 (8th Cir. 1980).
150. Chavkin, supra note 4, at 566, suggests that advocates who seek to improve or preserve
access to health care continue to rely on civil rights statutes like Title VI. The wave of reductions
in government health and social welfare assistance expenditures have already generated court
action. See, ag., Philadelphia Citizens in Action v.'Schweiker, No. 81-4452 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 20,
1981), rev'd, Nos. 81-2915, 81-2916, 81-2942 (3d Cir. Jan. 15, 1982) (unsuccessful challenge of the
Department of Health and Human Services' reduction in welfare assistance under the Administrative Procedures Act, 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1976)); Coleman v. O'Bannon, No. 81-5003 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 11,
1982) (state law prohibits a reduction in the eligibility standard for welfare benefits); Wolinsky &
Possley, HospitalsFileSuit to Stop State MedicalCutbacks, Chicago Sun-Times, Aug. 7, 1981, at
4, col. 1 (suit filed in federal district court to stop State's plan to reduce Medicaid payments to
hospitals). Other cutbacks have met with serious opposition which may turn into challenges of the
government actions in court. See, e.g., Rich & Teeley, HUDAides Warn Cuts CouldMean Riots at
Projects, Wash. Post, Dec. 4, 1981, at Al, col. 3 (reactions to proposed cuts in federal housing
programs); Russell, OMB Memo Proposes Closing St. Elizabeths, Wash. Post, Dec. 3, 1981, at Al,
col. 4 (Office of Management and Budget proposal to close federal facility for the mentally ill in
the District of Columbia); Engel, PublicHealth Service Hospitals Going Under, Wash. Post, Oct. 7,
1981, at A25, col. 3 (reactions to Department of Health and Human Services decision to close
public health service hospital system consisting of eight hospitals and 27 clinics around the country); Robinson, City May Sue U.S. Over CETA Cuts, Wash. Post, Mar. 28, 1981, at Cl, col. 4
(District of Columbia government reacts to cuts in Comprehensive Training and Employment Act
funding which affects over 1,000 jobs in District of Columbia area). Cf. Rich, HHS Trims List of
"Medically UnderservedAreas', Wash. Post, Nov. 4, 1981, at A23, col. 2 (redefining "medically
underserved area" will mean elimination of federal health care assistance from previously assisted
urban ghetto areas). So far, none of the reports of these most recent challenges has mentioned
express reliance on Title VI to support the claims of those who oppose the reductions in government benefits and services.
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tions and decisions that have severe racially disproportionate effects.
To redistribute health care services away from the residents of the urban ghetto not only creates the stigma of unequal treatment warned
against in Brown v. Boardof Education,151 but it also places those residents dangerously at risk because of inadequate access to medical care.
MitchellA. Horwich

151. 347 U.S. 483, 493-96 (1954). See generalo R. KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE: THE HISTORY
OF Brown v. BoardofEducation AND BLACK AMERICA'S STRUGGLE FOR EQUALITY 315-45 (1975);
Appendix to Brief for Appellant, Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), reprintedIn
37 MINN. L. REv. 427 (1953).

